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This thesis utilizes academic articles and monographs to examine Nazi Germany’s academic 
discourse regarding the “Muslim World” between 1935-1941. I argue that prominent Nazi 
thinkers considered the “Muslim World” to be a rising power but disagreed whether Muslims 
would enable or threaten Germany’s vision for a new Europe. Some theorists believed Muslims 
could function as important allies against Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Others worried 
that the same Islamic anticolonial-nationalism that rejected existing European colonial 
authorities would also spurn German leadership. Ultimately, these Nazi academics could not 
agree if the “Muslim World” presented an opportunity or an obstacle, and this fractured 
discourse foreshadowed the regime’s failure to adopt a concrete Islamic policy before its ill-fated 
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In the 1930s, the major European powers competed for colonies and influence in Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East. Colonies were a sign of economic, political, and military might, and 
Nazi Germany sought to rebuild itself as an imperial power. However, Hitler did not intend to 
reclaim the former overseas colonies held by Kaiser Wilhelm. Instead, the Führer turned his gaze 
toward the lands of the former Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires.   
Although Germany was committed to establishing a new Reich within the borders of 
continental Europe, the “Muslim World” weighed heavily on the minds of German academics 
and journalists.1 Hitler’s plans for expansion included the conquest of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, areas inhabited by numerous ethnic groups and tens of millions of Muslims. By 
1941, the Germans had already enacted their population “management” policies toward Jews, 
Poles, and (actual or accused) communists according to the regime’s racial theories.2 Jews and 
 
1 Cemil Aydin examines the origin of this term in his 2017 monograph The Idea of the “Muslim World.” In this 
intellectual history, he follows the origins and use of this term by both pan-Islamists and Islamophobes to achieve 
their respective political, social, and cultural agendas. Aydin traces the idea of the Muslim World back to the late 
nineteenth century, where it “arrived with imperial globalization and its concomitant ordering of humanity by race. 
The racialization of Islam was bound up with its transformation into a universal and uniform religious tradition, a 
force in international politics, and a distinct object in a discourse of civilizations. Political strategy and intellectual 
labor made this new reality, and both Muslims and European Christians took part.” The European colonial powers 
viewed Muslims as a single race united by a common religion, and this “racialized identity” was constructed by 
white Europeans in order to limit the rights of their Muslim subjects in the colonial era. For his full analysis, see 
Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2017). 
 
2 Nazi racial theory grew out of the nineteenth century European discourse of Social Darwinism and eugenics which 
offered “scientific” justifications for colonial rule and other forms of exploitation. For a recent analysis of Nazi 
racial science, see Erich Ehrenreich, The Nazi Ancestral Proof: Genealogy, Racial Science, and the Final Solution 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).  
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Bolshevik partisans were designated for extermination while the Slavic groups would be forcibly 
conscripted into labor battalions to build the new Reich. But no comparable decision had been 
made regarding the Muslim populations of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.  
Since the 1930s, German academics had evaluated the political developments burgeoning 
within the Muslim World and debated various strategies for “managing” Muslims. Recognizing 
the potential benefits of Muslim “volatility” in the colonial world, German thinkers believed 
Islam was capable of upsetting the post-1918 world order. These academics perceived “parallels” 
between National Socialism and Islam. They were particularly intrigued by Muslim rebellions in 
the colonies and by an alleged incompatibility between Islam and Bolshevism. However, these 
experts disagreed on how a rising Muslim World would impact Germany’s future empire. This 
formed the crux of Germany’s “Islam Question”: How “problematic” or “useful” were the 
Muslims, and where did the Muslims fit within Germany’s colonial vision?  
My research examines Nazi Germany’s academic discourse regarding the Muslim World 
between 1935-1941.  I seek answers to questions such as did German theorists consider Muslims 
to be a racial or a religious group? How did Germans characterize European-Muslim relations 
during this period? How did these experts view the Muslim states as political and economic 
actors on the world stage? What challenges and opportunities did the Muslim World present for 
Nazi Germany? Did these academics consider the Muslim World an emerging “family of 
nations” compatible with Germany’s “reinvigorated” Europe, or would these European and 
Muslim blocks be at odds?  
In this paper, I argue that prominent Nazi academics and journalists considered the 
Muslim World to be a rising power but disagreed whether Muslims would enable or threaten 
Germany’s vision for a new Europe. Some theorists believed Muslims could function as 
important allies against Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Others worried that the same 
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Islamic anticolonial-nationalism that rejected existing European colonial authorities would also 
spurn German leadership. Ultimately, these Nazi academics could not agree if the Muslim World 
presented an opportunity or an obstacle, and this fractured discourse foreshadowed the regime’s 
failure to adopt a concrete Islamic policy before its ill-fated invasion of the USSR, an invasion 
that would bring millions of Muslims under Nazi occupation. 
This project contributes to recent historiographical trends that place Nazi Germany within 
imperial and colonial contexts, illuminating Nazi academics’ assessment of the political, 
military, and economic “potential” within Muslim populations across the colonial world and 
demonstrating Nazi Germany’s engagement in near-peer competition with the other empires of 
its day.3  Additionally, this research further demonstrates the incoherence and subjectivity of 
Nazi racial theory, particularly its application to “non-European” peoples and the impossibility 
of reconciling such a theory with the complex demographic realities in the occupied zones. 
While attempting to implement these racial policies, German agencies tended to rely on religious 
affiliation and other cultural factors to distinguish between races and categorize local 
populations.4 Thus, Nazi interpretations of developments within the Muslim World provide an 
 
3 I rely on David Motadel’s contextualization of Nazi Germany’s patronage of anticolonial movements and courtship 
of anticolonial nationalist personalities as part of a wider trend among European empires. He contends that this 
behavior among imperial powers was routinely employed to undermine the political and economic integrity of rival 
empires. By engaging in anticolonial nationalist politics, Nazi Germany thought and behaved like other European 
colonial empires. For Motadel’s full analysis, see “The Global Authoritarian Moment and the Revolt Against 
Empire,” The American Historical Review, 06/2019, Volume 124, Issue 3, pp. 843-877. 
 
4 Richard Steigmann-Gall questions the degree to which fixed notions of racial science formed the basis of Nazi 
ideology: “At the heart of Nazism seems to lie a paradox between the claims that race was fixed, biological, and 
permanent and the Nazis’ recognition of the complexity of culturally constructed ‘races’ that were highly fluid, 
variable, and nebulous”: Richard Steigmann-Gall, “Neither Aryan nor Semite” in Beyond the Racial State: 
Rethinking Nazi Germany, ed. Devin O. Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard F. Wetzell (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 273. Other scholars have echoed these concerns, noting that the Nazi regime struggled to 
define Jews, Slavs, and Germans in scientifically “objective” terms like race or blood. Instead cultural, and 
especially religious, affiliation became important markers of identity in occupied Eastern Europe. For examinations 
of defining “Germanness” and “otherness” in the European borderlands, see Chad Bryant, Prague in Black: Nazi 
Rule and Czech Nationalism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) and John J. Kulczycki, Belonging to the 
Nation: Inclusion and Exclusion in the Polish-German Borderlands 1939-1951 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
4 
 
under-utilized framework for assessing German colonialism, racism, empire-building, and power 
in the interwar period. 
I build on recent scholarship by David Motadel and others that recognizes degrees of 
flexibility or paradox in Nazism’s racial theory, and my research bears out this conclusion. 
Needless to say, acknowledging Nazism’s ideological inconsistencies does not sanitize the 
atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, its agents, or its willing collaborators. Genocide, mass 
murder, medical experimentation, forced labor, starvation, torture, and imprisonment were all 
components of the Nazis’ crimes against humanity. I seek to use the Nazis’ perceptions of the 
Muslim World to further demonstrate the logical inconsistencies of their racial ideology. 
Although these racial concepts appeared concrete and enforceable in the party-state’s 
memorandums and speeches, these theories later proved difficult to enforce, because they were 
nebulous, irrational, and completely subjective.  
The historiography examining Nazi Germany, colonialism, and the Muslim World is 
underrepresented and heavily focused on German-Muslim relations before 1918. Many research 
studies have concentrated on German colonial initiatives in Africa under the Kaiserreich, the 
push by German colonialists to reclaim the “lost” African colonies, and the Nazi state’s colonial 
aspirations for “Germanizing” Eastern Europe.5 Works examining Nazi-Muslim relations during 
World War II are largely confined to the Middle East and North Africa, leaving room for future 
 
Press, 2016). For a case study examining German attempts at distinguishing between Volksdeutsche and Jews, see 
Eric C. Steinhart, The Holocaust and the Germanization of Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
  
5 For more on German colonialism under the Kaiser, see Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley, eds., German 
Colonialism in a Global Age, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). For a general history of German colonialism 
from 1870-1945, see Shelley Baranowski, Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to 
Hitler, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For more on the trajectory of German colonialism during 
the interwar period, including how former Colonialists reimagined themselves and colonialism under the Weimar 
Republic, see Sean Wempe, Revenants of a Fallen Empire: Colonial Germans, the League of Nations, and the 
Redefinition of Imperialism, 1919-1933 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). For recent examinations of 
Nazi-Era German colonialists and their campaign for re-establishing colonies in Africa, see Willeke Sandler, Empire 
in the Heimat: Colonialism and Public Culture in the Third Reich, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).  
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works to examine Nazi-Muslim relations in the Balkans and within the Soviet Union. Within the 
last ten years, perhaps the most influential historical studies examining Nazi Germany and the 
Muslim World are those produced by Jeffrey Herf, David Motadel, Francis Nicosia, and Stefan 
Ihrig.  
 Jeffrey Herf’s Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World was published in 2009 and offers the 
first comprehensive examination of Nazi Germany’s printed and radio propaganda campaigns in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Drawing on archival materials and English transcripts of 
Germany’s Arabic-language radio broadcasts, Herf identifies anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism as 
the primary themes around which this propaganda was designed. Herf argues that this 
propaganda campaign served both military and ideological purposes. The military value of the 
propaganda is clear: Winning support among the Muslim populations in North Africa and the 
Middle East would reduce opposition to Rommel’s Afrika Korps while simultaneously creating 
problems for the British Army. However, according to Herf, the propaganda campaign was also 
meant to proliferate anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism throughout the region. Using a selective 
reading of the Koran and weaponizing the Balfour Declaration, the Nazis intended to generate 
mass anti-Semitism among Muslims in order to highlight “similarities” between Islam and 
National Socialism and prepare for exporting the Holocaust to the Middle East. 
Building on the work of Jeffrey Herf, David Motadel has taken a broader look at Nazi 
Germany’s wartime Islamic policies. In 2014, Motadel published a monograph entitled Islam 
and Nazi Germany’s War, the first all-encompassing study of Nazi wartime policies toward 
Islam throughout the German-occupied areas of the Muslim World including North Africa, the 
Middle East, and Eastern Europe. He writes that the Nazi regime came to regard Muslims as both 
geographically and strategically important: “Geographically, as the European war turned 
increasingly into a world war, Muslim areas became war zones….Strategically, Germany’s 
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attempts to mobilize Muslims against their enemies were not the result of long-term planning but 
developed over the course of the war as the tide turned against the Axis.”6 Motadel’s synthesis 
examines continuities between Hitler’s regime and Imperial Germany, describes the role of Islam 
in German occupation policies and in areas behind the front lines, and outlines the role of Islam 
in German policies towards Muslims in the Wehrmacht.  
 In Nazi Germany and the Arab World, published one year after Motadel’s work, Francis 
Nicosia also analyzes Nazi Germany’s relations with Muslims but limits his scope to the Arab 
World, concentrating on the Middle East and North Africa. Nicosia presents two related 
arguments in this work. The first asserts that “there was indeed no ‘synthesis’ or ‘fusion’ of 
German interests and intentions and those of Arab nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists, or the 
political and intellectual elites in the European-controlled Arab states in the Middle East and 
North Africa.”7 The second argument contends “that there was clearly an absence of shared 
intent from the German side throughout the years of the Third Reich with regard to the 
achievement of Arab independence.”8 Nicosia concedes that Germany used propaganda and 
other means to influence Arab public opinion during wartime operations, but he believes the 
Nazi regime never intended to formally ally itself with the Arab World or provide military 
assistance to the nationalist movements looking to oust the imperial powers.   
 Stefan Ihrig’s Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination examines “how the Nazis perceived and 
portrayed Turkey” from 1919-1923 and 1933-1938. Ihrig argues that the German and Ottoman 
empires had an “entangled” history at the turn of the twentieth century, and that this mutual 
 
6 David Motadel, Islam and Nazi Germany’s War (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2014), 2. 
 
7 Francis R. Nicosia, Nazi Germany and the Arab World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 13. 
 
8 Ibid., 13-14. 
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fascination continued after 1918. In fact, Ihrig contends that Atatürk’s modernization program in 
Turkey was at least as influential in shaping Hitler’s platform for a “rejuvenated” Germany as 
Mussolini’s fascism. Although racial science is not his primary focus, Ihrig nevertheless 
demonstrates that Hitler’s Germany viewed Turks as racially European (and therefore Aryan) 
simply because the Nazis desired such a classification. In this sense, Ihrig’s work offers another 
example of Nazism’s ideological flexibility toward Muslim populations when such concessions 
served the Reich’s larger purpose. In this case, Nazi Germany hoped that gestures of goodwill 
and friendship, combined with decisive victories against the Red Army, would inspire Turkey to 
enter the Axis alliance. 
 Although the above historians disagree to what extent the Nazis intended to cooperate 
with Muslim populations across the colonial world, they have all demonstrated that Nazi 
Germany was not only interested in the Muslim World but also desired to shape the trajectory of 
political and military developments in the region before and during World War II. Whereas these 
previous studies have drawn from a wealth of archival evidence in Europe and the United States, 
my research relies on several publications produced by academics and journalists for public 
consumption between 1935 and 1941. This periodization corresponds with the implementation of 
the Nuremberg Laws and the political, economic, social, and military developments leading up to 
Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht’s invasion of the Soviet Union. Thus, I am interested in 
examining the competing resolutions to Germany’s “Islam Question” before the Wehrmacht, SS, 
and other regime agencies had significant Muslim populations living under their jurisdiction.  
In many ways, Nazi Germany’s discussion of the “Islam Question” is a continuation of 
German colonial and political discourses from the Imperial Era. Beginning in the early 1900s, 
Germans became increasingly interested in Islam, in large part because of Muslim presence and 
Islamic influence in the colonies of German East Africa, Cameroon, and Togo. Academics, 
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politicians, and colonial authorities in Germany, and in Europe more generally, associated the 
Muslim World with “the slave trade, superficial and magic elements of faith, polygamous 
practices, the complete absence of agency, and the fact that Islam threatened first to overrun the 
African colonies and then all of Europe.”9 Indeed, the “danger” Islam presented to Europe rose 
to the forefront of this debate due to “numerous uprisings in African colonies that could be traced 
back to Islam.”10 If the Nazis intended to reinstate Germany as a formidable empire, their 
expansion on the European continent would ultimately require an answer to the “Islam 
Question.”  
But Nazi Germany was not the only European power grappling with the “Islam 
Question.” During this period, the British, French, and Soviets “governed more Muslim subjects 
than any independent Muslim state,” a demographic circumstance that made Islam and Muslims 
a significant, nearly existential, concern for these imperial regimes.11 As anticolonial-nationalist 
movements swept across North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia in the 1930s, Germany 
observed these developments and evaluated the effectiveness (or shortcomings) of British, 
French, and Soviet colonial policies. These political movements incited unrest and threatened the 
stability of the European imperial possessions. This upheaval also worked in Germany’s favor, 
drawing European attention toward the colonies and away from German activities on the 
continent. 
In the following sections, I use a selection of articles, monographs, and essays to examine 
the themes, debates, and changes in Germany’s academic discourse regarding the Muslim World 
 
9 Rebekka Habermas, “Debates on Islam in Imperial Germany,” in Islam and the European Empires, ed. David 
Motadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 239. 
 
10 Ibid, 247. 
 
11 David Motadel, ed., Islam and the European Empires (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2. 
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and Great Power politics. I have organized this discourse thematically in order to identify shared 
ideas, controversial subjects, and possibilities for Germany’s intervention in the colonial world. 
Specifically, I discuss Nazi definitions of the “Muslim World,” racialization of Muslims, Islam’s 
“parallels” to National Socialism, Islam’s “incompatibility” with Bolshevism, and German 
interpretations of Islamic nationalism and Islamic solidarity. 
The books and articles I have chosen to analyze present certain limitations. First, these 
sources clearly demonstrate a political and ideological slant that favors the National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) platform. These authors were either party members or worked 
for party-affiliated organizations, which suggests they supported the party’s ideology or were at 
least willing to do so in writing. For many German academics in particular, “National Socialism 
was not seen as a threat to humanity and intellectual freedom but as a chance for the humanities 
to play a role in the critical caesura of the times, in which ‘the living spirit’ would emerge and 
the future of modernity would be decided.”12 The ambiguity of the Nazi worldview enabled 
academics and journalists to “give shape and substance to the new political reality,” and “enjoy a 
relatively wide latitude to develop their own philosophical narrative of National Socialism.”13 In 
other words, writers could publish on any number of topics so long as they did not contradict 
existing policies and adapted their opinions and analyses to fit (an aspect of) the party-state’s 
ideology. In fact, this “patriotic” academic tradition emerged in Imperial Germany, when many 
humanists reacted to “colonialism, the deepening of international rivalries, and the coming of the 
 
12 Wolfgang Bialas and Anson Rabinach, ed., Nazi Germany and the Humanities (London: Oneworld Publications, 
2007), xxix. 
 




Great War” by offering their services and expertise to the regime and its agenda.14 The rise of 
Nazism accelerated this practice rather than stalling or eliminating it. 
Second, these sources do not reflect bureaucratic or diplomatic conversations between 
Hitler and the leaders of the regime’s administrative offices. As a result, my source base does not 
reveal the thoughts and opinions of the regime itself but rather the academic discourse circulating 
outside of, but tangential to, the regime apparatus.15 I use the term “academic discourse” to 
describe the conversations these scholars and journalists have with each other, other technical 
experts, and broader German society through their writing. All of the pieces analyzed here were 
available to the general reading public, and several of them were written for mass consumption. 
However, it is not clear how widely these books and articles were circulated outside of academic 
and political circles. Additionally, this source base does not reveal how much influence, if any, 
these academics exercised on the regime’s internal policy debates regarding the Muslim World. 
However, it is highly probable that this fractured academic discourse mirrored the indecision 
within the regime apparatus. 
Third, these sources comprise only a small sample of the published monographs and 
articles analyzing Muslims and Islam between 1935-1941. The authors examined here include 
Paul Schmitz, a journalist for the NSDAP’s daily newspaper the Völkischer Beobachter; 
Gotthard Jäschke and Richard Hartmann, both professors at the University of Berlin; and 
Heinrich Eck, Hans Lindemann, Hans Hummel, and Hans Rabl, all political scientists affiliated 
 
14 Suzanne Marchand, “Nazism, Orientalism, and Humanism” in Nazi Germany and the Humanities (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2007), 271. 
 
15 My project builds onto David Motadel’s work in Chapter 2 in Islam and Nazi Germany’s War. In this chapter, 
Motadel traces German discussions about Islam and the Muslim World through interagency, diplomatic, and “mass 
consumption” publications and communications from the early 1900s through 1945. Using some of the same non-
archival sources, my analysis focuses strictly on aspects of the “academic discourse” and provides a deeper analysis 
of these actors and their publications.   
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with the University of Munich. Due to the limited scope of this project, I have limited my 
analysis to only one or two works by each of these personalities. The articles written by Heinrich 
Eck and Hans Rabl were published in 1936. The selections by Hans Hummel, Paul Schmitz, and 
Gotthard Jäschke were published in 1937, and Hans Lindemann’s monograph was released in 
early 1941. This list includes neither all the academics participating in this discourse nor all of 
their works, but these selected personalities and publications do represent some of the more 
prominent writers and institutions involved. There remains significant room for future research 
into intellectual or organizational histories of the individual people, institutions, and discursive 
themes presented here. 
Despite these limitations, the weaknesses outlined above also serve as strengths. These 
“outsider” perspectives external to the regime apparatus reveal how German academics and 
journalists interpreted Germany’s standing in the post-1918 world order, how they read the 
“dangers” of European colonization in Africa and Asia, and championed (or cautioned against) 
diplomatic opportunities in the Muslim World. Although not officially integrated into the state’s 
policy-making machinery, these “outsiders” desired to educate their audiences about the 
importance of the Muslim World. They undoubtedly competed with each other for discursive 
primacy and wished to influence bureaucrats, policy-makers, diplomats, and military officers 
formulating or enforcing state goals and policies.  
 
Section I: The Origins of Nazi Colonialism and Hitler’s Mein Kampf  
In Mein Kampf, first published in 1925, Adolf Hitler describes his platform for the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party, and he is especially concerned with three factors: Lebensraum, 
colonization of the continent, and assessments of allies and enemies. Lebensraum, literally 
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translated as “living space,” was a territorial policy advocated by Hitler whose central premise 
was that each nation was entitled to enough land with an adequate carrying capacity to support 
its population. In describing the NSDAP’s foreign policy aims, Hitler claims the most central 
tenet of that policy is to “safeguard the existence on this planet of the race embodied in the state, 
by creating a healthy, viable natural relation between the nation’s population and growth on the 
one hand and the quantity and quality of its soil on the other hand.”16 In other words, the German 
people needed to feed and provide for themselves using the resources of the land which they 
inhabited. If that land mass later became incapable of producing enough food and other 
necessities, “Germany must not let political boundaries obscure for us the boundaries of eternal 
justice. If this earth really has room for all to live in, let us be given the soil we need for our 
livelihood.”17 Political boundaries then, at least in Hitler’s view, were not something with which 
to be concerned; they were invisible, malleable, unnatural, and thus subject to change. Land was 
a finite resource and the strongest, most industrially-capable nations were entitled to claim what 
was rightfully theirs. 
 However, while the European powers focused on expanding the colonization of Africa 
and Asia, Hitler discounted overseas colonies as unviable for Germany. He believed overseas 
territories weakened the European imperial powers, making them “like pyramids stood on their 
heads. Their European area is absurdly small in comparison to their weight of colonies, foreign 
trade, etc.”18 This geographical separation between the national home and the colonial territories 
threatened to create cultural distance between Europeans on the continent and abroad. Hitler 
 
16 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 643. 
 
17 Ibid., 138. 
 




contrasted this imperial model with that of the United States, whose political and economic base 
occupied nearly an entire continent while its overseas colonial holdings were substantially 
smaller.19 He upheld the United States’ colonial structure as ideal, suggesting that Germany 
could emulate this arrangement on the European continent, “enhancing the area of the mother 
country, and hence not only keeping the new settlers in the most intimate community with the 
land of their origin, but securing for the total area those advantages which lie in its unified 
magnitude.”20   
 Hitler’s colonial ambitions lay to the East, in the lands of the former Austro-Hungarian 
and Russian empires. He envisioned Germany’s continental colonies as a romanticized, idyllic 
agrarian landscape, settled and farmed by morally-upstanding ethnic Germans who would 
produce enough foodstuffs to feed Germany’s growing population. Unlike British or French 
colonies overseas, the lands of Eastern Europe would be repopulated with German settlers. There 
would be no attempt at “Germanization” of the Slavs, Jews, or other ethnicities, because 
“Germanization can only be applied to soil and never to people.”21 Germanization could never 
overcome the racial differences between Germans and non-Germans unless Germans could 
“succeed in transforming the blood of the subjected people. But this is impossible.”22 According 
 
19 Carroll Kakel argues that the Holocaust, an atrocity he says includes both Jewish and non-Jewish victims, was 
inspired by the European and American discourses of racism, imperialism, and colonialism. American conceptions 
of frontier, Manifest Destiny, and Indian Wars inspired German colonial discourse during the Imperial and interwar 
periods, becoming particularly significant under the Nazi regime. In speaking of the “Wild East” and its Slavic 
inhabitants, Hitler even went as far as to compare these peoples to the American “Redskins.” For more, see Carroll 
P. Kakel, III, The Holocaust as Colonial Genocide: Hitler’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the ‘Wild East’ (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2013). 
 
20 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 653. 
 
21 Ibid., 388. 
 




to Hitler’s racial theory, all attempts at “cultural Germanization” would never succeed and only 
result in dilution of German racial, linguistic, and cultural superiority. 
Hitler’s contempt for Jews and Slavs was palpable and as was his derision for non-
Europeans. In one section of Mein Kampf, Hitler recalls the “League of Oppressed Nations” and 
these nations’ interest in working with German National Socialists after 1918 to liberate 
oppressed peoples from British and French domination. Hitler disparagingly refers to these 
anticolonial nationalists from the Balkans, Egypt, and India as “pompous big-mouths,” “inflated 
Orientals,” and “Asiatic jugglers.”23 He doubts that these anticolonial nationalists are legitimate 
representatives of their respective peoples, and he predicts that their movements will fail. Hitler 
estimates the British Empire would willingly defend its colonial possessions with “its last drop of 
blood,” and a German alliance “with a coalition of cripples” could never overrun such a powerful 
state.24  
Leaving no doubt about his opinion of the “League of Oppressed Nations,” Hitler 
concludes with his racial evaluation of these peoples: “I am prevented by mere knowledge of the 
racial inferiority of these so-called ‘oppressed nations’ from linking the destiny of my own 
people with theirs.”25 Hitler uses similar language to describe German-Muslim relations, 
 
23 Ibid., 656-657. 
 
24 Ibid., 659. It should also be noted that Hitler’s assessment of the British Empire, the largest Muslim state of the 
interwar period, was one of begrudging admiration. On the one hand, Hitler preached that overseas empires were 
doomed from the start as successive generations of European settlers inevitably became culturally, linguistically, 
and even racially separated from the mother country. But on the other hand, Hitler cites England as an exception to 
this rule, explaining that Britain “can be compared to no other state in Europe” (139) and “in reality is merely the 
great capital of the British world empire which calls nearly a quarter of the earth’s surface its own” (644). He 
attributes the empire’s longevity and power to the masterful execution of diplomacy since the seventeenth century. 
The British diplomatic strategy strove to thwart “by all possible means the rise of any European great power above 
its place in the general hierarchy, and, if possible, to break it by military intervention” (613). Hitler acknowledges 
that a rising Imperial Germany felt the full military might of Britain and its allies during World War I, but he claims 
that British animosity toward Germany ended in 1918. In fact, Hitler argues that now is the time for Germany to 
forge a military alliance with Britain against France and Russia. 
 




specifically referencing Germany’s ill-fated 1914 alliance with the declining Ottoman Empire. 
He sees this alliance as one of Germany’s greatest foreign policy mistakes writing, “While the 
greatest military and industrial states on earth banded into an active aggressive union, we 
collected a few antique, impotent state formations and with the decaying rubbish attempted to 
face an active world coalition.”26  
Given that German academics and the Nazi state later debated forming alliances with 
Muslim nations, Hitler must have overcome these opinions, at least to some degree. Why did he 
change his mind? Much of the answer is likely due to timing. As Hitler composed Mein Kampf, 
the world order was changing and so was the colonial (Muslim) world within it: the Ottoman 
Empire had collapsed, the sultanate was abolished, and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk became the head 
of the newly declared Turkish Republic. Ataturk’s agenda included a robust modernization 
program, which would differentiate the new, modern, “Europeanized” Turkey from the 
“decaying” Ottoman state Hitler remembered. In fact, historian Stefan Ihrig suggests that perhaps 
Hitler’s critical and snide language masks his true feelings. In Ihrig’s estimation, it would have 
been dangerous for Hitler to praise Atatürk outright in Weimar Germany. Such an admission 
would have been equivalent to “admitting to aspirations of a violent seizure of power, with the 
promise of war against the Versailles powers, civil war, and the establishment of a strong 
dictatorship.”27 Additionally, similar efforts were also underway in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and other areas of the Middle East and Asia. Despite his clear contempt for Muslims and other 
colonial peoples in 1925, Hitler later exercised a degree of ideological flexibility during the war 
 
26 Ibid., 657. 
 




and willingly overlooked the non-Aryan characteristics of the Arabs, Turks, and Caucasians in 
pursuit of military victory against the Allies.28   
 
Section II: Mapping the Muslim World and Racializing its Peoples 
In writing about the “Muslim World” between 1935 and 1941, Nazi academics and journalists 
referred to this region and its inhabitants using a variety of terms: Orient and Orientals, Islamic 
World and Islamites, “Morningland” and “Morninglanders,” Muslims, and Mohammedans. 
These terms are used in contrast with Europe, the Occident, the “Eveningland,” and Christianity. 
Such rhetorical choices emphasize the “otherness” of the regions and peoples they describe and 
create binaries between Europe and the “Muslim World.” German academics characterized 
Muslims as a monolithic religious and national community, linked by their devotion to and strict 
observance of Islam. Although they recognized different racial categories of Muslims (such as 
Africans, Arabs, Indians, or Turks), they repeatedly emphasized that religious confession 
outweighed any national or ethnic solidarity felt by Muslims. Thus, Muslims enjoyed a singular 
identity and shared worldview that “Christian” Europe did not.  
Nazi writers and academics also largely agreed on the geographical borders of the 
Muslim World. Party journalist Paul Schmitz29 described the “Oriental Islamic World” as 
stretching from “North Africa and the lands of the Mediterranean Sea to India and the Far 
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propaganda campaigns in the Middle East. British authorities became aware of his propagandistic role and forced his 
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East.”30 Hans Lindemann, a political scientist affiliated with Karl Haushofer’s Institut für 
Geopolitik, similarly sketched the borders of the Muslim World from North Africa across the 
Middle East to India and Central Asia.31 Hans Hummel, another political scientist with ties to the 
Institut für Geopolitik, expanded on these boundaries by including the Mediterranean region as 
well. He described the Mediterranean and the “Orient” as “standing between” Europe, Asia, and 
Africa and “bearing, not only politically but also physically, the face of the transition between 
strange worlds.”32 In his summation, the boundaries of the “Orient” reached from Morocco to 
India and Afghanistan and from the Pyrenees Mountains to the Balkans and the Caucasus.  
Additionally, these authors all acknowledge and assess the competing spheres of 
influence between England, France, Spain, Italy, and the USSR. Interestingly, Europe’s Muslim 
populations in the Balkans, Crimea, and Caucasus are left out of these analyses. Although these 
regions are acknowledged as part of the Muslim World periphery, their Muslim inhabitants are 
not mentioned. These writers do not explain this omission, but perhaps these Muslim groups 
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31 Hans Lindemann was a German political scientist affiliated with Karl Haushofer’s Institut für Geopolitik. Karl 
Haushofer is considered the father of Geopolitik in German academia and headed the Institut für Geopolitik at the 
University of Munich, which examined international relations of the day, including Muslim-European relations and 
developments in the Muslim World (Motadel, 28). Geopolitik was a “scientific” concept that fused geography, 
natural resources, and political destiny and eventually became the basis for Hitler’s Lebensraum theory. One of 
Haushofer’s students at Munich was Rudolf Hess, who later introduced him to Hitler. Haushofer visited both men 
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theories. Haushofer was not a member of the NSDAP but maintained ties to the party until 1938 when he fell out of 
favor. The reasons for his fall are unclear but may be related to difficulties with his family situation. His wife was of 
Jewish descent and Haushofer’s son, Albrecht, who was also closely affiliated with the NSDAP (although he 
disagreed with its politics), was arrested in 1944 and executed in 1945 for his ties to the resistance. Haushofer and 
his wife committed suicide a year after their son’s death. For more on Karl Haushofer, see Carroll P. Kakel, III, The 
Holocaust as Colonial Genocide: Hitler’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the ‘Wild East’ (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013) 
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were considered more “European” than “Oriental.” Or perhaps they did not know how to 
properly classify them within Nazism’s racial hierarchy and so avoided the topic altogether. 
All of the speakers within this source base speak of Arabs, Turks, and Africans in 
paternalistic and racist terms, but Hans Lindemann was especially disparaging in his 
characterizations of non-Europeans. In 1941, Hans Lindemann published malicious comments 
against colonial peoples reminiscent of Hitler’s language in Mein Kampf. Lindemann describes 
the “whole primitive pagan world” as going through a tumultuous time in which the “cultural 
influences of modern times penetrate the smallest pores and cracks of the pagan folk body” 
within the “black continent.”33 Lindemann claims that this “hopeless collapse of religion, 
customs, and morals” has spurred the search for “new leaders and rescuers who will give them a 
feasible way out of the turbulence and dangers.”34 He writes that Bolshevism and Islam have 
emerged to answer the call, but notes that (except for the industrial areas of Africa) Bolshevism 
is too radical for these “heathen people,” and it is this group that is “easy prey for Islam”:  
“Islam leaves them with their penchant for magic, for spirit worship; for it is on this that the 
whole heart of the heathen rests. According to his old belief, through the possession of magical 
powers, man becomes mighty and great and has power over all things and people and also over 
the invisible, hidden forces and powers. Islam understands how to use this weakest point in 
paganism to its advantage. Islam not only allows 'black art', Islam even promotes it…Magic is 
easier and better in the Islamic faith than in the old paganism…So the teaching of the prophet 
understands everywhere to adapt to blood and soil and to tolerate even reprehensible customs and 
folk customs among their followers with great tolerance.”35 
In his estimation, Muslims are sly and manipulative. Not only are Muslims growing their 
population through high birth rates, but Muslims are also winning the souls of neighboring 
nations. Islamic conversion successes contrast sharply with the experience of Christian 
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missionaries, who struggle to explain the appeal and tenets of Christianity to these same “pagan” 
populations. Lindemann abhors the fact that some Africans, who had earlier converted to 
Christianity, are now converting to Islam. He rationalizes this trend by theorizing that Africans 
“absolutely cannot understand” Christianity, let alone abide by its commandments or adhere to 
its moral codes, and are drawn to Islam not only because of its “simplicity” and acceptance of 
“pagan” traditions but also because the races are equal under Islam.36 He writes that whereas 
Christianity recognizes racial equality only before God, rather than among men on Earth, Islam 
allows African believers to feel that they are “socially and universally equal to the other Muslims 
who are not black or colored” in the eyes of God and in contacts and dealings with other men.37 
Lindemann concludes that this appeal, along with the “Muslim World’s” explosive population 
growth, contributes to the Islamic states’ growing political influence and their “striving for world 
domination.”38  
Although he reserves his most venomous characterizations for Black Africans, 
Lindemann is nevertheless racist toward Arab and Turkic populations as well. He considers 
Islam and its adherents to comprise a potent and subversive force, but he is convinced that Islam 
is not politically (or culturally) powerful enough to challenge Germany. However, he concludes 
his monograph by stating that Germany and Italy consider the Islamic states to be “on the same 
footing as themselves.”39 How does Lindemann reconcile this overt racism with his praise for the 
perceived historical and political parallels between the Muslim World and Germany? He does 
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not attempt such a reconciliation in this work, and perhaps he thinks such an explanation is 
unnecessary: Islam is powerful enough to challenge Germany’s enemies (i.e. Great Britain and 
France) but not so strong as to threaten Germany or its allies. Indeed, his conflicting remarks 
reveal not only the inconsistencies of Nazi racial theory but also hint at the regime’s ideological 
flexibility in racializing Muslims. At least in the short term, Lindemann seems to support using 
the Muslims against France and Britain in order to meet the regime’s immediate priorities. 
Lindemann also mentions Muslims’ drive for “world domination,” an accusation within 
Nazi discourse that is usually reserved for “International Jewry.”40 It is unclear why Lindemann 
believes Muslims desire “world domination,” or even what such an achievement would entail, 
but he seems to believe that Islam is a force that can (and must) be “managed” effectively by 
Europeans. He cautions that when Germany regains its lost African colonies, it is vital that 
Germany refrain from “violating their [Muslims’] religious sensitivities” and be willing to “make 
concessions to Islam in order to avoid causing unpleasant conflicts that could lead to constant 
unrest.”41 In his view, the West European powers have failed to strike this balance, and Germany 
must learn from those mistakes. Lindemann does not compare the alleged global ambitions of 
Muslims and Jews, but when we remember that Nazi rhetoric railed against the “world-
domination-aspirations” of “Global Jewry,” Lindemann’s comments and Nazi antisemitic 
propaganda seem to suggest that if both Jews and Muslims threatened the global order, the 
 
40 In early 1939, Hitler presented his annual speech to the Reichstag. At the peak of his power and popularity, Hitler 
warned of a conspiratorial “International Jewry” determined to destroy Germany. This myth soon became the 
centerpiece of Nazi propaganda and continued to be propagated throughout the war. For more, see Jeffrey Herf, The 
Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2006).  
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Muslim “problem” could be “managed” whereas the Jewish “problem” would require a different 
solution. 
 Interestingly, Lindemann also distinguishes Muslims as belonging to different races 
when, as shown above, he comments on “the other Muslims who are not black or colored.” He 
also references “black, yellow, and brown peoples” who may “unite against Europe under the 
green flag of the Prophet of Mecca.”42 Who are these non-Black and non-Colored Muslims? 
Lindemann does not elaborate, but perhaps he is referring to Muslims in the Balkans, Crimea, or 
the Caucasus as these are the only “Islamic” regions left out of his analysis. Writing on the eve 
of Operation Barbarossa, Lindemann may have avoided racializing European Muslims, because 
the regime had not yet finalized its Islam policy or its assessment of these populations as 
“friendly” or “dangerous.” This omission would have spared Lindemann the embarrassment of 
publicly of potentially contradicting the regime’s future decision regarding Islam and Muslims in 
Eastern Europe.  
 
Section III: Islam’s “Parallels” to National Socialism 
Hans Lindemann and journalist Paul Schmitz allude to Islam’s “parallels” to National Socialism. 
Transposing the major tenets of National Socialism onto the political and social developments 
happening within the Muslim World, these writers identify purported similarities between the 
German and Islamic “communities of fate,” including a shared admiration of strong leadership 
and the growing need for access to arable land and natural resources. Although they often 
highlight the same themes and concepts, Schmitz and Lindemann differ in their assessments: 
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Were these “parallels” between National Socialism and Islam valuable (and exploitable) or 
threatening? 
Schmitz’s 1937 monograph, All-Islam! Weltmacht von Morgen? describes how emerging 
Muslim leaders assessed the implications of a growing population and its likely impact on 
international politics. Schmitz writes:  
“The position of a number of political leaders seemed particularly meaningful, who on the one 
hand had to be addressed as representatives of broad strata of the people, but on the other hand as 
fanatical nationalists and advocates of an Islamic community of fate…[one among them] pointed 
out that that the abundance of births is the secret of the political future of the Islamic World, there 
the natural fertility must at last triumph and in the long run will break the state of superiority of 
the West, which is less fertile. And another pointed out that a rich birthrate alone was not a 
guarantee of a national future, as China and India show. But a growing population is an 
indispensable requirement for such a future and the basis for the cultivation of a necessary pool of 
leaders who are no less important for the future of the nation than natural fertility. It is not the 
birth rate that should be restricted, but instead great energy should be used to expand the 
Lebensraum and Lebensmöglichkeiten [life possibilities].”43   
 
Schmitz believes the Muslim states recognized the importance of a burgeoning population in 
their struggle to restore “their lost political significance and power.”44 The Muslim World’s 
unchecked population growth not only gave it a numerical advantage against European 
colonizers but also legitimized Muslims’ claims for additional land and resources. Schmitz’s 
portrayal implicitly echoes several key themes of Nazi rhetoric, particularly the idea that a 
nation’s future hinged on its ability to increase and protect its collective body. Population growth 
within the Muslim World, according to the logics of Nazism, necessitated an increase in land, 
resources, and protection of ethnic and cultural identity. To meet these growing requirements, the 
Islamic states needed to regain political influence within the global order and win independence 
from their colonial masters. Such a feat was certainly within the realm of possibility – a growing 
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Muslim population could easily field large armies of young, able-bodied men. Although Schmitz 
sees this “overlap” between the Islamic states and Nazi Germany, he is pessimistic about what 
these developments could mean for Germany and its future empire. Would Muslims use their 
growing military potential, ideological allegiance, and shared identity against the European 
empires, including Germany? It was certainly a possibility. 
Hans Lindemann is much more explicit in finding commonalities between National 
Socialism and Islam, and his assessment is more optimistic. Writing four years after Schmitz, 
Lindemann’s monograph states that Germany sees itself as “on the same level”45 as the Islamic 
states, and that Islam and National Socialism exhibit “manifold parallels and analogous 
appearances in their development as well as in their outlooks and principles.”46 Nazi Germany 
and the Islamic World have both resurrected their nations from the humiliation and destruction of 
World War I, renewed a sense of solidarity amongst their peoples, embraced strong state 
leadership, “impressed the same strong beliefs, the same high enthusiasm for justice and truth of 
their cause, their goals, their struggles.”47 In fact, Lindemann praises Hitler and Ataturk’s 
leadership in the same paragraph. Turkey, under Ataturk’s “leadership of genius,” has achieved 
its goals of national independence, political autonomy, and freedom.48 Lindemann believes that 
Ataturk is doing for the Islamic World what Hitler is doing for Germany: Bringing modernity, 
solidarity, and national pride to their respective peoples. 
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 In addition to these alleged ideological parallels, Schmitz and Lindemann also describe 
the ways in which Arab suffering can be attributed to the Jews. In Palestine, a primary 
destination of mass Jewish migration in the 1920s and 1930s, Schmitz writes that the Arab 
birthrate outpaced that of the Jews by nearly 2.5 times.49 Thus, “the immigration of Jewish 
capitalists” was critical to building Jewish numerical strength in the competition with Arabs for 
power, land, and resources.50 Additionally, Schmitz sees “international Judaism” as a willing 
participant in British imperial schemes in the region and “creating a buffer between the demands 
of Islamic nationalism and the interests of the empire.”51 He alleges this British-Jewish 
collaboration further cemented Britain’s foothold in Palestine by creating a Jewish quasi-client-
state that would “always need England as an ally and friend in order to be able to assert itself 
against the oncoming Islamic nationalism in its right to live and to living space.”52 He sees a 
similar pattern at work in the French colonies of Algeria and Tunis where “almost half of the 
organized communists” are Jews and Muslims “are victimized by Jewish police and financiers 
who control the flow of money and credit.”53 Schmitz is convinced that Jews have become the 
“enemies” of Islam: they participate in the colonial exploitation of Arabs, contribute to the 
spread of communism, and use their legal and financial connections to harass and abuse 
Muslims. Remaining consistent with Nazi antisemitic propaganda, Schmitz reserves such 
anticapitalist language for Jews and their allegedly exploitative activities. However, when 
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Schmitz discusses Muslims’ embrace of capitalism, he praises such industry as an admirable 
virtue, because it further underscores the incompatibility of Islam and Bolshevism. 
Lindemann is, perhaps surprisingly, much more conservative in linking the Jews to 
Muslim suffering. Much of his anti-Jewish rhetoric discusses how the British have betrayed the 
Arabs through their stewardship of the Jews. Besides allowing mass Jewish emigration into 
Palestine, the British have also failed to meet the needs of the Arab population, particularly in the 
realm of education. Lindemann writes that although nearly 85 percent of Arabs were illiterate, 
“the English authority had allotted too few resources for the education and learning of the Arab 
population, while one hundred percent of Jewish children would be taught in elementary and 
secondary schools and at the Jewish universities.”54 He similarly condemns the French colonial 
system for attempting to “deprive these tribes [the Berbers of Morocco] of their faith and 
Christianize them” while granting full citizenship to “the Jews they [the Muslims] hate.”55 These 
passages demonstrate Lindemann’s criticism of British and French colonial policy in the Muslim 
World: Not only did these European powers fail to properly care for and provide for their Islamic 
subjects, they also privileged the Jewish communities at the expense of the Muslims. Both 
writers warn that these offenses will only contribute to a growing sense of Islamic nationalism 
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Section IV: Islam as “Incompatible” with Bolshevism 
It is well documented that Nazism desired to eliminate the “Judeo-Bolshevik” threat and did not 
tolerate communism as an ideology or socioeconomic system. Nazi academics of this period 
agree that Islam was “incompatible” with Bolshevism. As mentioned earlier, Lindemann 
believed that Bolshevism was too “radical” for the Muslims in Asia and Africa, but how did 
other writers characterize Bolshevism and its (in)compatibility with Islam? Of the writers 
examined here, all agree that Muslims could never tolerate Bolshevism but offer different 
explanations. 
Heinrich Eck, another contributor to the political science journal Zeitschrift für 
Geopolitik, attributes this alleged incompatibility with anticolonial nationalism. Eck writes that 
the Russian Revolution was accomplished relatively easily in the urban industrialized areas, 
because the population was “much more susceptible to [Lenin’s] ideas than the remaining 
population.”56 However, Central Asia presented a different set of challenges including: “a 
population that was backward in its development, whose history exhibits religious fanaticism, 
patriarchal clan ideas, the guilty character of the craft and feudal economic systems as 
characteristic features of public life.”57 Eck concludes that although the Bolsheviks undoubtedly 
modernized and improved the Central Asian economy, “the Soviet Russian policy has 
contributed to the awakening of many of the national feelings in Turkey, Persia, and China.”58 
Eck accuses Moscow of following a “double politics” in Central Asia in which the Soviets 
“pretend on the outside to be a protector of the land against colonial conquests of the European 
 








powers” but in practice Moscow seeks the “dissolution of the Islamic congregations and 
suppression of the Pan-Turkic Movement.”59 Although Moscow’s economic projects may 
succeed in Central Asia, Eck warns that Soviet Muslims are “unaware of their own strength.”60 
But once that strength is realized and Muslims unite against Soviet domination, “the political and 
religious feelings of the Asian…[will] degenerate into a devastating explosion at first 
opportunity,” and this strength will threaten Soviet rule.61 Thus, Eck classifies the Bolshevik-
Islamic fissure in terms of anticolonial-nationalism rather than as a political-religious conflict. 
Gotthard Jäschke disagrees, citing irreconcilable views on religion as the source of 
Bolshevik-Islamic “incompatibility”. In a 1938 article examining Turkish-Soviet relations, he 
writes that there exists an “abyss” between Bolshevism and Islam: “Just as a pious Muslim 
absolutely rejects Marxist-Socialism, a true Bolshevik must regard Islam, as any other religion, 
as ‘opium for the people’ and stubbornly fight it.”62 But this “abyss” did not stop the Soviets or 
the Turks from using each other to achieve their political and economic policy aims, especially in 
the aftermath of World War I. Turkey possessed an “awareness of the shared interests with the 
Russian Soviet Republic in the struggle against European imperialism,” and this awareness 
“created an atmosphere of brotherhood in which a certain preference for Bolshevik concepts 
could flourish.”63 Similarly, the Soviets saw an opportunity in Turkey, and elsewhere in the 
Muslim World, to harness the energies of anticolonial liberation movements to bring about the 
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international communist revolution. But rather than becoming convinced of the viability and 
correctness of the Soviet project, Ataturk “did not close his eyes to the [Bolshevik] danger”64 and 
formally banned communist propaganda in July 1922.65 In Jäschke’s estimation, Turkey’s 
flirtation with Bolshevism was simply a means to an end: preventing Turkey from becoming a 
European colony. 
Schmitz’s examination represents the third position: The Soviet Union would never win 
over its Muslim populations because of its antireligious policies and maltreatment. He notes that 
immediately after 1917, the Bolsheviks were “the first European power to take a completely new 
position on the Islamic World, and did so in such a way that the relations between the imperial 
states and the Islamic Orient needed to be revised.”66 By approaching the newly-independent 
Islamic states as equals, the Soviets positioned themselves as the antithesis to European 
imperialism, desiring to “foment Islamic unrest and have the Muslims as partners in the fight 
against western imperialism.”67 The Soviet Union hoped Muslims would not only join its fight 
against the imperial powers but also stage their national independence movements as supporting 
acts of the global Marxist revolution. These hopes were expressed at the “International Congress 
of Oriental Peoples” in Baku in 1920. Schmitz writes that this Congress exposed the fragility of 
“Soviet Oriental Policy” - the Bolsheviks severely underestimated the appeal of anticolonial-
nationalism to Islamic audiences. Schmitz writes that the Baku attendees were divided into two 
camps: communists who saw national revolution in the Muslim World as a step toward social 
revolution, and supporters of national (but not social) revolution who saw Russia as a political 
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and military ally who would help them defend against or win their national sovereignty from the 
Western European empires.68 However, Soviet attitudes toward Muslims soured in the late 1920s 
when the “mask of tolerance” dropped and the Stalinist regime launched a severe antireligious 
campaign.69 Collectivization commenced in 1928 and the Great Terror followed in 1937-1938, a 
period in which at least 14,000 Muslim clergy were arrested, killed, or exiled.70 Schmitz writes 
that news of these exiled leaders spread from within Russia “despite all censorship and increased 
the distrust of the devout Muslims towards Moscow patronage.”71 Although initially praised for 
its diplomatic practices in the Muslim World, the Soviet Union is, in Schmitz’s view, an example 
not to be followed.  
 
Section V: Islamic Nationalism and Islamic Solidarity - Opportunity or Obstacle? 
 
Nazi thinkers considered Islamic nationalism to be an anti-colonial, cultural-religious, monolithic 
identity shared by all Muslims across the colonial world. Paul Schmitz and Hans Lindemann 
praise the rise of Islamic nationalism, particularly its anticolonial orientation and potential for 
disrupting British and French imperialism in the Middle East and Africa. Their critics, Professors 
Gotthard Jäschke and Richard Hartmann, also agree that Islamic nationalism is a powerful force 
within the Muslim World but disagree on semantics: how different is Islamic nationalism from 
European nationalism, and did Islam inspire this nationalist movement or did nationalism inspire 
an Islamic religious revival? Beyond these minor disagreements, the consensus regarding Islamic 
nationalism begins to fracture over varying interpretations of Islamic solidarity. If individual 
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Islamic states achieved independence from Britain and France, would Muslims coalesce into a 
national front that would challenge, or even endanger, the European “family of nations” Nazi 
Germany intended to create?72 Or could the “Islamic bloc” (Islamische-Block or Nah-Ost Block), 
characterized as such by Hans Rabl and Paul Schmitz, be persuaded to accept German leadership 
and support its imperial visions, perhaps even joining Nazi Germany’s fight against the Soviet 
Union and Bolshevism? These are the questions posited by Paul Schmitz, Hans Lindemann, 
Gotthard Jäschke, Richard Hartmann, and Hans Rabl.  
Paul Schmitz and Hans Lindemann expend much energy analyzing the movements of 
Islamic nationalism and Islamic solidarity. Schmitz offers the most complete definition of 
Islamic nationalism, describing it as the “successor” to the Pan-Islamic Movement,73 which, in 
the widely held colonial view, had emerged due to Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s attempt to 
unite all Muslims against the “Christian West” through a discourse extolling a shared religious 
 
72 Johannes Dafinger published a recent article examining “European solidarity” within the Nazi discourse and the 
concept of a European “family”. He argues that the Nazis not only believed in the possibility of European solidarity 
but used it positively within the party discourse beginning in the mid-1930s. Dafinger identifies three components of 
this solidarity as postulated by the Nazis. First, Nazis espoused the ideas of “kinship” and “family” among European 
peoples; Europeans were members of the Aryan race and thus biologically related to the Germans. This racial logic 
also excluded certain groups from the European “family”, namely the Jews and Slavs (908-909). Secondly, the 
Nazis believed Aryan Europe was united by a mutual fear of and hatred for communism. Hitler’s allies in East-
Central and Southeastern Europe also sympathized with the Nazi’s “anti-parliamentarian convictions and ultra-
nationalist worldviews” (909). Finally, Nazi Germany praised inter-European cooperation and shared experiences, 
both historical and contemporary, as evidence of European solidarity (909). According to the Nazis, these concepts 
combined to form European solidarity which then manifested as “political loyalty between the European ‘peoples’” 
(911). The discourse surrounding European solidarity and the Muslim World evokes these themes of race, political 
sympathies, and shared experiences. For Dafinger’s full analysis, see Johannes Dafinger, "Show solidarity, live 
solitarily: the Nazi ‘New Europe’ as a ‘family of peoples’," European Review of History, Volume 24, Issue 6 
(2017): 905-917. 
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identity and common threat.74 In Schmitz’s view, Islamic nationalism reinvigorated these 
foundational ideas and reappeared in the interwar period as both “secular and national in the 
sense of the European model” but also “religious-Islamic, meaning ‘Oriental’ or ‘anti-
Occidental.’”75 He identifies Islamic nationalism as the driving force behind the rise of the post-
war Muslim World, and he draws firm distinctions between Islamic nationalism and variants of 
European nationalism. Schmitz argues that whereas European nationalism superseded religion, 
religion cannot be separated from Islamic nationalism; instead, religion and nationalism are 
permanently intertwined among Muslims. Importantly, he also praises Islamic nationalism for 
encouraging modernization efforts (especially in the fields of science, infrastructure, and natural 
resource exploitation) and for inspiring decolonization movements.  
Hans Lindemann agrees with Schmitz’s characterization of Islamic nationalism. 
Lindemann describes this phenomenon as a combination of religious and national elements that 
arose in response to “the imperialist claims of inheritance” in the wake of World War I.76 He 
cites the Pan-Arab Movement77 as particularly representative of the “close relationship between 
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religion and nationalism.”78 Headed by intellectuals and the “pioneers of the political dispute 
with the Western Powers,” the Pan-Arab Movement symbolizes “the recently awakened Islamic 
nationalism in its stronger potency, as an expression of the most violent reaction against the 
Western world and Christianity.”79 For Lindemann, the strength of Islamic identity is rooted in 
the importance of Mecca as its religious capital and Islam’s site of pilgrimage: “From Mecca, all 
kinds of political influences flow into the world of Islam, which come from the common 
religious experience.”80 Like Schmitz, Lindemann stresses that “religion and politics go hand in 
hand in Islam from the beginning”81 and that Islamic unity is only “internationally significant” if 
Muslims around the world “stand in common defense against the common enemy: the West, its 
influences, and claim to power.”82  
Gotthard Jäschke, disagrees with Lindemann’s contention that all of these developments 
can be attributed to Islam: “Isn’t it rather that the not insignificant religious manifestations of life 
in some Islamic countries are only a consequence of the national movement that has also 
captured them?”83 Rather than seeing nationalism as an outgrowth of Islamic religious revival, 
 










83 For a biographical sketch, see Klaus Kreiser, “Gotthard Jäschke (1894-1983): Von der Islamkunde zur 
Auslandswissenschaft,” Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 38, Issue 3, Nov. 1998, pp. 406-423. Gotthard 
Jäschke was one of the leading specialists on modern Turkey in Germany’s academic circles. After completing his 
military service during World War I, Jäschke represented Germany as a lawyer with the Foreign Office before 
pursuing an academic career and joining the Oriental Seminary at the University of Berlin in 1931. In 1940, this 
department was converted to a “foreign science faculty” whose professors were well-known for being especially 
committed to the National-Socialist cause. As the department underwent these developments, Jäschke became a 
“representative of ‘Special Foreign Studies’ in the service of the regime” and joined the NSDAP (Kreiser 407, 415). 
He would later claim that joining the party was forced, although it is more likely that he joined the party to “secure 
his professional and material position.” (Kreiser 415). For Jäschke’s review of Lindemann’s monograph see 
33 
 
Jäschke maintains the opposite: Islamic nationalism has launched a religious revival. Perhaps 
Jäschke believes that for Islamic nationalist movements to grow and succeed, these nations must 
define their identities against those of their oppressors. Islam was one of the most obvious 
differences between the “Orient” and the West and could be used by Islamic nationalist leaders 
to generate unity among disparate populations and recall a shared past under the former Ottoman 
Empire. 
Richard Hartmann disagrees with Schmitz and Lindemann’s characterizations of Islamic 
nationalism as a phenomenon different from European nationalisms. He concedes that 
“nationalism takes on a special character in every people” but disagrees that the Muslim World’s 
shared political and intellectual history has created a unique strain of nationalism.84 Instead, 
Hartmann argues that “nationalism combines with the currents from the historical heritage of a 
people everywhere in a different way and therefore has a different manifestation without being 
fundamentally different in essence.”85 Hartmann also believes that the Muslim World is united 
more by politics, economics, and culture rather than religion. Hartmann is unique in that he does 
not see Islam as an “orthodox” or “uniform” religion practiced from North Africa to Central Asia 
without variation. Hartmann sees greater similarities between Muslims and Europeans than the 
other scholars examined here. 
While these writers agree on the significance (if not the form or origins) of Islamic 
nationalism, and even admire this development within the colonial territories, they are divided in 
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their interpretations of Islamic solidarity. Schmitz asserts that the Islamic states have formed a 
“coalition” or “front” that is engaged in political and economic cooperation to “increase self-
development and noticeable growth in resistance to European colonial desires.”86 Islam has 
bridged ethnic differences between the Turks and Arabs, creating conditions that make “the 
political and economic interaction of the Islamic states fruitful and prosperous”.87 In his 
assessment, the Muslim World’s solidarity is based on transnational political and economic 
cooperation and empowerment that threatens European supremacy in the world order. Schmitz 
believes Muslim unity presents “the most urgent appeal to European solidarity,” and will 
“challenge the white race on three continents.” 88 How will, or should, Europe respond to this 
challenge? Schmitz fears that the Muslim World will overpower a fractured and disjointed 
Europe. Once united by a shared Christian faith and ideas of humanism, Europe is now united 
only by fear: “The fear of the Asian, which threatens to undermine the Occidental 
order…[and]the fear of the African peoples and their fertility.”89 But even this fear has not 
revived European solidarity, and “the West as a spiritual unit and Europe as a political unit no 
longer exist.”90  
Hans Rabl published similar thoughts in the Zeitschrift für Politik (Journal for Politics).91 
He warns that the emerging “union of Islamic nation states” should serve as a model for 
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European solidarity. In his view, European solidarity would be “a block that, despite the 
independence of the individual, will be firmly fixed in the common resistance against every 
enemy from the outside, against the threat of the Islamic worldview and penetration of foreign 
races into the common space.”92 Rabl emphasizes that the resentment and defensive attitude 
toward the colonial powers is “particularly remarkable and dangerous for Europe.”93  He is 
unsure of whether the “union of Islamic nation states” threatens all of Europe, but Rabl believes 
that Islam presents a danger, at a minimum, to France and Britain. Like Schmitz, Rabl urges a 
cautionary stance: “a clear demarcation of the fronts can only be an advantage.”94 
Lindemann also describes the growing solidarity among the Muslim states as permeating 
religion, culture, and politics and perceives differentials between surging Islamic and crumbling 
European solidarities. However, Lindemann disagrees with Schmitz and Rabl’s conclusions that 
these trends present a danger to Germany. He argues instead that as long as the Germans and 
Italians “find the right way of treating the Muslims in their policies – especially in the colonies,” 
“Germany and Italy have little to fear from…Islam.”95 Although “the policies of the Islamic 
states, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Islamism” represent “a great danger,” this is true “only for the 
western democracies and Holland,” who see themselves as superior to the Islamic states.96 
Lindemann recognizes the emerging influence of the Muslim World in international politics, but 
he doubts that Islam will one day be a peer of the European states. Rather, Lindemann attributes 
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the significance of the Muslim World to the uniqueness of Islam, which penetrates every facet of 
government, economics, and daily life to an extent not “observed anywhere else on earth”.97  
 
Conclusion 
This paper examined a small sample of Nazi Germany’s academic discourse concerning the 
interwar Muslim World. These writers considered Muslims to be a monolithic religious and 
national body, united by their intense observance of and devotion to their religion. Although 
conceding that some Muslims were “racially” Turkic, Indian, African, or otherwise, these 
academics repeatedly emphasized that Muslims were first and foremost defined by their religious 
confession and thus enjoyed a solidarity and singular identity that “Christian” Europe did not. 
This alleged Islamic solidarity made a German partnership with Muslims both enticing and risky: 
Could Islamic solidarity and nationalism be harnessed to sabotage the French, British, and Soviet 
colonial and military projects? Could the Islamic states support Germany’s colonial ambitions in 
Europe and perhaps beyond? 
The discourse examined here proved fractured and inconclusive, foreshadowing the 
regime’s failure to adopt a concrete Islamic policy before its invasion of the USSR. These 
academics remained divided over their interpretations of the anticolonial-nationalist movements 
burgeoning in the Muslim World and their potential impact on Germany. On the one hand, 
forging an alliance with Muslims made sense. These German thinkers recognized alleged 
“parallels” between National Socialism and the Islamic nationalist movements: admiration for 
strong leaders, desire for unified national bodies, growing anti-French and British sentiments, 
and an aversion to communism. On the other hand, the growing influence of Islamic solidarity 
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could inspire Muslims to reject European leadership of any kind, including that offered by 
Germany. Additionally, they perceived the Muslims to be manipulative, superstitious, and 
inferior. The Germans believed that any attempt at partnership would require the Muslims to be 
correctly “managed,” which meant replacing the clumsy and ineffective colonial strategies of the 
French and British with certain “concessions” that would keep the peace between the German 
colonizers and the (re)colonized Muslims. Thus, regardless of how “useful” Muslim allies might 
be, any partnership between Nazi Germany and the Muslim World would be marked by 
suspicion, racial prejudice, and an imbalance of power.  
Ultimately, the academics examined here could not reach a consensus on which path to 
take. They failed to provide a viable answer to the “Islam Question” and did not persuade 
Hitler’s regime to adopt a concrete Islamic policy before launching Operation Barbarossa. 
Instead, Germany’s high-stakes invasion of the Soviet Union brought tens of millions of 
Muslims under Nazi occupation, catapulting the unanswered “Islam Question” from theoretical 
musings into the realm of empire-building. Without a precise policy, the answers to this question 
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